Stage 2: integrate administrative login and protect dashboard

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# Administrative authentication foundation
## Stage 1 scope
## Integrated administrative sign-in
This foundation is independent of NextAuth, Prisma, CRM, the existing `/admin`
page restriction, and draft deletion. It provides shared-credential login,
logout, and session-status API handlers only. It is not wired into `/admin` or
any storage API in this stage.
Administrators sign in at `/admin/login` using the shared credential configured
as `ADMIN_AUTH_SECRET`. The page submits the credential directly to
`POST /api/admin/auth/login`; it does not place the credential in a URL or store
it in browser storage.
Successful authentication creates the administrative session cookie and sends
the browser to `/admin`. The `/admin` server-side loader validates that cookie
before loading administrative data. A valid session is not sufficient by
itself: the existing `/admin` IP allowlist remains an additional restriction,
and a valid administrator outside the allowed network is sent to `/403`.
The administrative interface provides a **Sign out** control which calls
`POST /api/admin/auth/logout`, clears the cookie, and returns the browser to
`/admin/login`. Sessions expire after 20 minutes and expired, invalid, or
missing sessions are redirected to the login page.
## Required server-side configuration
@@ -38,6 +49,42 @@ administrative secrets fail closed.
continue verifying signature and expiry on every request.
- This is shared-credential authentication. A valid token proves knowledge of
the shared credential, not the identity of a named administrator.
- Protecting `/admin` prevents its server-side Prisma, storage, and CRM data
loading from running without a valid administrative session. It does not by
itself protect browser-addressable API routes.
## Administrative API protection limitations
The current administrative UI directly uses API routes that do not yet enforce
the administrative session, including:
- `/api/admin/getnewappeals_api`
- `/api/admin/getlatestdocuments_api`
- `/api/admin/getStatusCountsByAppeal_api`
- `/api/admin/getStatusCountsByAppealAndLPA_api`
The appeals and documents routes expose paging operations used after the page
has loaded. The status routes expose administrative dashboard reads. These
routes retain their existing relay token and HMAC behaviour but have no
independent administrative-session authorization. A later authorised stage
must enforce the administrative session on privileged API routes and account
for both browser calls and the existing server-side bootstrap callers.
Storage download, representation editing, queue actions, and draft deletion
also retain their existing authorization behaviour in this stage. In
particular, the original cross-container deletion risk is not remediated by the
administrative page login and remains a separate mitigation boundary.
Directly observed storage routes include:
- `/api/file/getrepsblobproxy`, which forwards a caller-supplied container using
server relay credentials and path signing.
- `/api/file/editRepJson`, which performs a direct blob mutation and has no
visible administrative-session or HMAC check.
- `/api/file/downloadblob` and `/api/file/createrepcompletemessage_api`, which
enforce existing path-HMAC checks but not administrative authorization.
- `/api/file/deleteblobcase` and `/api/file/deleteblobrep`, whose existing
cross-container deletion behaviour is intentionally unchanged in this stage.
## Deployment requirements before production use