Add independent administrative authentication foundation

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# Administrative authentication foundation
## Stage 1 scope
This foundation is independent of NextAuth, Prisma, CRM, the existing `/admin`
page restriction, and draft deletion. It provides shared-credential login,
logout, and session-status API handlers only. It is not wired into `/admin` or
any storage API in this stage.
## Required server-side configuration
The deployment must provide all of the following server-side values:
- `ADMIN_AUTH_SECRET`: a unique high-entropy administrative passphrase of at
least 32 characters.
- `ADMIN_SESSION_SECRET`: a different unique high-entropy signing key of at
least 32 characters.
- `NEXTAUTH_URL`: the existing canonical application URL. Administrative login
and logout compare the request `Origin` with this server-configured origin.
The administrative values must never use a `NEXT_PUBLIC_` prefix or be exposed
to browser JavaScript. Do not commit real values. Missing, short, or identical
administrative secrets fail closed.
## Security properties and limitations
- Credentials are derived with Node `scrypt` and compared with
`timingSafeEqual`.
- Sessions are stateless, versioned HMAC-SHA256 tokens with a 20-minute fixed
lifetime and a random nonce.
- The cookie is `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, scoped to `/`, explicitly
expires, and is `Secure` in production.
- Login and logout require an exact same-origin `Origin` match against
`NEXTAUTH_URL`; missing or malformed origins fail closed.
- Authentication responses use `Cache-Control: no-store`.
- Logout clears the browser cookie. Because sessions are stateless, a stolen
token can remain valid until its short expiry; later protected routes must
continue verifying signature and expiry on every request.
- This is shared-credential authentication. A valid token proves knowledge of
the shared credential, not the identity of a named administrator.
## Deployment requirements before production use
The repository does not provide a demonstrated distributed rate-limit service.
Administrative login must therefore be protected by an ingress, gateway, WAF,
or shared backing service that enforces rate limits consistently across all
deployed instances. A process-local limiter is intentionally not used because
it would reset on restart and could be bypassed across instances.
The deployment must also ensure `NEXTAUTH_URL` is the correct canonical HTTPS
origin. Login and logout intentionally do not derive trust from `Host` or
forwarding headers.
Any future administrative state-changing API must require more than possession
of the cookie: it must independently validate the administrative session and
enforce same-origin/CSRF protection before performing side effects.