# Administrative authentication foundation ## Stage 1 scope This foundation is independent of NextAuth, Prisma, CRM, the existing `/admin` page restriction, and draft deletion. It provides shared-credential login, logout, and session-status API handlers only. It is not wired into `/admin` or any storage API in this stage. ## Required server-side configuration The deployment must provide all of the following server-side values: - `ADMIN_AUTH_SECRET`: a unique high-entropy administrative passphrase of at least 32 characters. - `ADMIN_SESSION_SECRET`: a different unique high-entropy signing key of at least 32 characters. - `NEXTAUTH_URL`: the existing canonical application URL. Administrative login and logout compare the request `Origin` with this server-configured origin. The administrative values must never use a `NEXT_PUBLIC_` prefix or be exposed to browser JavaScript. Do not commit real values. Missing, short, or identical administrative secrets fail closed. ## Security properties and limitations - Credentials are derived with Node `scrypt` and compared with `timingSafeEqual`. - Sessions are stateless, versioned HMAC-SHA256 tokens with a 20-minute fixed lifetime and a random nonce. - The cookie is `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, scoped to `/`, explicitly expires, and is `Secure` in production. - Login and logout require an exact same-origin `Origin` match against `NEXTAUTH_URL`; missing or malformed origins fail closed. - Authentication responses use `Cache-Control: no-store`. - Logout clears the browser cookie. Because sessions are stateless, a stolen token can remain valid until its short expiry; later protected routes must continue verifying signature and expiry on every request. - This is shared-credential authentication. A valid token proves knowledge of the shared credential, not the identity of a named administrator. ## Deployment requirements before production use The repository does not provide a demonstrated distributed rate-limit service. Administrative login must therefore be protected by an ingress, gateway, WAF, or shared backing service that enforces rate limits consistently across all deployed instances. A process-local limiter is intentionally not used because it would reset on restart and could be bypassed across instances. The deployment must also ensure `NEXTAUTH_URL` is the correct canonical HTTPS origin. Login and logout intentionally do not derive trust from `Host` or forwarding headers. Any future administrative state-changing API must require more than possession of the cookie: it must independently validate the administrative session and enforce same-origin/CSRF protection before performing side effects.